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The Federal Antitrust Laws and
Radius Clauses in Shopping
Center Leases
By ADRIENNE J. MARSH*
The decades of the 1960's and 1970's may well be viewed as
the golden age of the shopping center.1 Mirroring the massive pop-
ulation shift from downtown urban areas to the suburbs, regional
shopping centers and malls virtually have replaced traditional
"downtown" shopping areas in providing bedroom community re-
sidents with an "'integration of all retail and commercial functions
of modern life and the activities that people are involved in: en-
tertainment, recreation, health, shopping, eating, education.'" In-
deed, by 1976, shopping centers in America accounted for at least
forty-four percent of all retail sales, excluding automotive and
building centers. s
In the face of such a significant role, there is growing concern
* B.S., 1965, University of Chicago; M.S., 1968, New York University; J.D., 1980, Ford-
ham University. Member, New York Bar.
1. A "shopping center" is defined as a "group of commercial establishments, planned,
developed, owned and managed as a unit related in location, size and type of shops to the
trade area that the unit serves; it provides on-site parking in definite relationship to the
types and sizes of stores." URBAN LAN INsTrruTs, THE COMMUNrrY BumDERS HANDBOOK 264
(1968), quoted in Eagle, Shopping Center Control: The Developer Beseiged, 51 J. URB. L.
585, 585 n.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Eagle]. Three categories of shopping centers have
emerged, distinguished more by their function and major tenants than by their size: the
neighborhood, the community, and the regional center. Id. The neighborhood center pro-
vides for the day to day needs of the neighborhood and usually has a gross leasable area of
50,000 square feet and a supermarket as its primary tenant. Id. at 585-86 & n.1. The com-
munity center has a gross leasable area of 100,000 to 300,000 square feet, and its major
tenant usually is a junior department store, a variety store, or a discount store. Id. The
regional shopping center usually is built around at least one full-line department store and
has a gross leasable area of 300,000 to 1,000,000 square feet. Id.
2. BusiNEss WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971, at 34 (quoting James W. Rouse, developer).
3. FoRBns, June 1,. 1976, at 35, cited in Schear & Sheehan, Restrictive Lease Clauses
and the Exclusion of Discounters from Regional Shopping Centers, 25 EMORY L.J. 609, 609
n.3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Schear & Sheehan].
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within the shopping center industry that various restrictive cove-
nants customarily included in shopping center leases will be in-
creasingly subject to attack on antitrust grounds by both the gov-
ernment and private parties. 4 The most typical of these restrictive
covenants5 are: "approval clauses," which provide the center's ma-
jor tenants with the right to approve other tenants;6 clauses that
provide the right of the major tenant or the developer to control
the quality and price of the goods to be offered by lessees; "exclu-
sive clauses" whereby the landlord agrees not to lease to any com-
petitor of a tenant;8 and "radius clauses," which over a set period
prohibit the tenant from opening another retail operation within a
specified distance from the leased premises.9
This Article examines the potential application of federal anti-
4. See Dalno Sales Co. v. Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 988
(D.D.C.), afl'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Rouse Co., 85 F.T.C. 848 (1975); Tysons Cor-
ner Regional Shopping Center, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,532 (F.T.C. 1974); Gimbel Bros., Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 20,478 (F.T.C. 1973).
5. Other restrictive clauses in a shopping center lease require tenants to be open dur-
ing specified hours, forbid alterations or the use of signs or advertisements visible to the
mall without the developer's approval, and require tenants to join and support the
merchants' association. Eagle, supra note 1, at 615. Tenants also may be required to time
the opening of their stores to that of the shopping center, to carry on business continuously
through the term of the lease, and to restrict use of the premises to specified purposes in
order to ensure the proper mix of goods and services within the center. Note, The Shopping
Centre Lease, 35 U. TORoNTo FAcuLTY L. REV. 107, 110 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. RaP. (CCH) 20,532 (F.T.C. 1974); Gimbel Bros., Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,478 (F.T.C. 1973). But see Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tysons
Corner Regional Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir.
1970). The right of approval clause was proscribed in the consent decree against the Tysons
Corner Regional Shopping Center. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,933, at 20,774 (F.T.C.
1975). See notes 128-34 & accompanying text infra. Major tenants usually justify their de-
mands for right of approval clauses by the need to protect the "image" of the shopping
center in order to attract customers. Schear & Sheehan, supra note 3, at 612.
7. See, e.g., Rouse Co., 85 F.T.C. 848 (1975). This category includes "no discounter"
clauses which restrict the availability of mall leases to discount stores. The significance of
"no discounter" clauses recently has diminished. Major tenants now can expect exclusion of
discounters by developers who tacitly understand that to admit discounters might displease
the major tenant on whom the developer depends. Furthermore, discounters often volunta-
rily refrain from locating in a regional mall. See Schear & Sheehan, supra note 3, at 621-30.
8. An "exclusive" clause may limit the competition in a particular product. See Eagle,
supra note 1, at 614 n.209; Lentzner, The Antitrust Implications of Radius Clauses in
Shopping Center Leases, 55 J. URB. L. 1, 2 n.4, 34 n.117 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Lentzner].
9. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 2. For examples of radius clauses, see id. at 2 n.5. Among
the typically used restrictive clauses, radius clauses most clearly favor the developer.
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trust laws to radius clauses, particularly in regional shopping
center leases. 10 The Article advocates that antitrust challenges of
radius clauses should be analyzed under a rule of reason,11 giving
special consideration to the reasonableness of the covenant's terms,
the size of the shopping center, the existence of alternative sites of
competition, and the availability of a less restrictive clause.12 In
this regard the Article differs from, and in some measure responds
to, the suggestion by the commentators that radius clauses be
treated as per se violations of the antitrust laws."3 The Article con-
cludes that in applying antitrust laws, a regional shopping center
should be viewed as a joint venture whose uniqueness as a business
enterprise dictates special relationships among the developer, the
major tenants, and the satellite tenants."
The Need for Radius Clauses: A Question of
Finance
In order to appreciate the importance of the radius clause to
developers, one must first understand the problems in financing a
shopping center. Because of its size, a regional shopping center re-
quires vast amounts of capital outlay. The funding problem is ex-
acerbated by higher construction costs per square foot for a re-
gional shopping center than for a smaller, less sophisticated
shopping center.1 5 In order to attract the necessary investment
10. Regional shopping centers are especially vulnerable to federal antitrust challenges
for three reasons. Because of their size and the tenants who operate interstate, the interstate
commerce element of federal law is more readily resolved. See notes 46-61 & accompanying.
text infra. Secondly, exclusion from a regional center effectively may bar a retailer from the
entire trade area because often there is only one regional center in a particular trade area.
See Note, The Antitrust Implications of Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center Leases,
86 HARv. L. REv. 1201, 1208-09 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Implications]. The
"trade area" of a shopping center is "that area from which is obtained the major portion of
the continuing patronage necessary for steady support of the shopping center." URBAN LAND
INSTrtuTE, THE COMMuNITY BUILDERS HANDBOOK 264 (1968), quoted in Eagle, supra note 1,
at 625 n.279. The regional center thus may be deemed an essential outlet for retailers. De-
nial of an essential resource to competitors may be an antitrust violation. Finally, the guide-
lines established by FTC consent decrees, see note 136 & accompanying text infra, apply
only to larger shopping centers.
11. See notes 62-63 & accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 170-91 & accompanying text infra.
13. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 61-66.
14. See notes 155-62 & accompanying text infra.
15. In one study the estimated cost per square foot of a regional shopping center was
$35 while that for a neighborhood center was $19. See Lentzner, supra note 8, at 13 n.30.
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capital, the developer of a regional shopping mall must turn to ma-
jor lending institutions.16 To assure themselves of the venture's ec-
onomic viability, the major lending institutions place a variety of
conditions upon their loans.17 For example, where a larger shop-
ping center is involved, the lending institution typically requires
the signing of a certain number of Triple-A tenants" to long-term
leases. It therefore is critical that the developer sign at least one
major department store to a long-term lease.' 9 In fact, to induce a
department store to locate at the mall, the developer will often in-
cur a financial loss on the major tenant's long-term lease. 0
Although the major department store generates the financial
backing and attracts both smaller retailers and consumers to the
shopping center, the developer looks to the smaller retailers for its
profits.2 ' The minimum base rentals charged to smaller retailers
The developer initially obtains a short-term construction loan which is replaced, after con-
struction is completed, by a long-term mortgage loan. Id.
16. See generally id. at 12-13.
17. See id. at 13-14. See generally Eagle, supra note 1, at 616 n.227.
18. A "Triple-A tenant" has a net worth of $1,000,000 or more and is usually at least a
medium-sized chain with several units. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 13 n.33. The ability to
attract the full-line department stores is especially important to the financing institution,
and therefore to the developer of a regional center. Id. at 13-14.
19. The major department store provides security both by virtue of the long-term
lease and by its power to draw other retailers and customers to the shopping center. Id. at
13-14. Although it has been suggested that having smaller tenants purchase lease insurance
is an alternative to depending on Triple-A tenants for the security demanded by financing
institutions, see Antitrust Implications, supra note 10, at 1205, cited in Schear & Sheehan,
supra note 3, at 612 n.18, such smaller tenants could not provide the "drawing power" of a
major department store. Thus a major tenant's importance to the ultimate economic success
of the regional shopping center gives it a great deal of bargaining power with'the developer.
See note 87 infra.
20. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 591 n.41. See generally Lentzner, supra note 8, at 13-
14. Normally, "anchor tenant" leases contain the lowest rental rates in the shopping center.
Eagle, supra note 1, at 600. One study found that annual rent per foot of gross leasable area
in regional shopping centers was $1.46 for national department stores but $6.00 or more for
local card and gift shops. Id. at 600 n.106. Rentals per square foot vary directly with the size
of the store but inversely with the customer drawing power, sales volume per square foot of
gross leasable area, and choice location of the store. Id. at 601 n.111. Rent differentials in
shopping center leases have been held not violative of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1976), because a lease is not a commodity sold within the meaning of the Act. Plum
Tree, Inc. v. N.K. Winston Corp., 351 F. Supp. 80, 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See Antitrust
Implications, supra note 10, at 1206 n.19.
Lower rental rates are not the sole incentive used to induce major tenants to sign long-
term leases; a variety of costly concessions may be granted. See generally Eagle, supra note
1, at 600; Lentzner, supra note 8, at 13 n.35; Pollack, Clauses in a Shopping Center Lease,
PRAC. LAW., May, 1970, at 38.
21. See Lentzner, supra note 8, at 14. See also Eagle, supra note 1, at 591 n.41.
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are designed to recapture the developer's initial capital outlay.22 It
is the percentage lease,23 however, in which rent is based at least in
part on sales volume, that creates the developer's profits. This reli-
ance upon percentage leases invites the use of radius clauses.24 In-
deed, "[t]he radius clause is... primarily a safety mechanism to
protect the landlord's share of percentage rent"'25 based on the vol-
ume of sales at the leased premises.
Developers may fear that a tenant opening another nearby
outlet would reduce volume at the original store, thereby diminish-
ing the return on the percentage rental.26 At least one commenta-
tor has suggested that the fear of reduced rental revenues is un-
founded because "imprudent over-expansion also has a deleterious
impact on the tenant's business."2 This suggestion, however, ig-
nores the possibility that what may seem to be prudent expansion
will after the fact turn out to be just the contrary.2 Thus, should a
tenant overexpand and both outlets fare poorly, the developer's
revenues would be diminished.
The use of radius clauses may also be justified on the ground
that the opening of a second outlet near the regional center
reduces customer traffic throughout the mall, thereby diminishing
the developer's percentage rentals from the other tenants. Unlike
the older downtown shopping centers which grew randomly, shop-
ping centers are developed and designed as "single, integrated re-
tail communit[ies]." 2 To provide comprehensive one-stop shop-
22. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 14. The total base rentals from all tenants must cover
all cash expenditures, including taxes, insurance, interest, amortization of principal, and
maintenance costs. Id. at 13 nn.34, 38; see also Rogers & Brown, Shopping Center Financ-
ing, 43 U. Mo. KAN. CrTY L. REv. 1, 5 (1974).
23. In the usual shopping center percentage lease, the tenant agrees to pay a fixed
base rental, plus a surcharge rental based upon a stated percentage of the tenant's gross
sales. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 14-15 (citing Hemingway, Selected Problems in Leases of
Community and Regional Shopping Centers, 16 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 12 (1964); Colbourn, A
Guide to Problems in Shopping Center Leases, 29 BROOKLYN L. REv. 56, 60, 70 (1962)).
24. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 14.
25. Id. at 15. Cf. id. at 2 n.5 ("It]he effect of [a radius clause] is to restrict desirable
tenants to a certain shopping area and prevent them from generating customer interest in
nearby competitive centers").
26. Id. at 11, 14.
27. Id. at 11.
28. Discussing landlords of smaller shopping centers, Mr. Lentzner states without
elaborating that "the natural forces of the marketplace provide adequate protection for a
landlord from potentially damaging repercussions resulting from tenant overexpansion." Id.
29. Note, Sherman Act Implications of Major Tenant Veto Powers in Regional Shop-
ping Centers, 29 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 67, 67 (1972). The development of individual units
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ping, the developer must assemble a balanced assortment of stores
and services 0 that in turn generates a volume of customer traffic
that inures to the developer's benefit. Use of a radius clause to pre-
vent the opening of a second outlet is one means by which a devel-
oper seeks to maintain the balance and thus to ensure that cus-
tomer volume is not disturbed.
Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Regional
Shopping Center Leases
There are four major federal antitrust statutes: the Sherman
Act,31 the Clayton Act,3 2 the Robinson-Patman Act,33 and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act34 (FTCA). Because the Clayton Act
and the Robinson-Patman Act, itself a part of the Clayton Act,
require that the challenged activity be "in commerce"3 5 and deal
only with the sale of commodities, these Acts have no application
to restrictive covenants in real estate leases.36
into an integrated whole is the primary distinction between shopping centers and other
commercial building enterprises. Note, Sherman Act Challenges to Shopping Center
Leases: Restrictive Covenants as Restraints of Trade Under Section 1, 7 GA. L. Rxv. 311,
313 (1973).
30. One of the primary justifications that developers assert for right of approval
clauses, clauses controlling the range of goods, and "exclusive" clauses is the need to offer a
balanced assortment of merchandise for sale and to foster the "image" of the shopping
center as a whole. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 38-39.
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
32. Id. §§ 12-27.
33. Id. § 13.
34. Id. §§ 41-58.
35. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974), the Supreme Court
stated: "In contrast to § 1 [of the Sherman Act], the distinct 'in commerce' language of the
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Act provisions. . . appears to denote only persons or activi-
ties within the flow of interstate commerce-the practical, economic continuity in the gener-
ation of goods and services for interstate markets and their transport and distribution to the
consumer. If this is so, the jurisdictional requirements of these provisions cannot be satisfied
merely by showing that allegedly anticompetitive acquisitions and activities affect com-
merce." Id. at 195 (emphasis in original).
36. In determining whether price discrimination in rentals contained in real estate
leases was a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, it was held that a leasehold is not a
"commodity" being "sold" within the meaning of the Act. Plum Tree, Inc. v. N.K. Winston
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 80, 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Furthermore, when considering the problems
of price discrimination in shopping center lease rentals, the Senate Select Committee on
Small Business concluded: "Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, is not applicable, because it applies to the sale of commodities and not to the
leasing of real estate." SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BusiNEss, THE IMPACT O SuBuRBAN
SHOPPING CENTERS ON INDEPENDENT RETAILERS, S. REP. No. 1016, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 24
[Vol. 32
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Notwithstanding the fact that real estate traditionally has
been considered a local activity,3 7 restrictive covenants in real es-
tate leases are within the jurisdiction of both the Sherman Act38
and the FTCA39 Jurisdiction under these statutes extends to ac-
tivities both "in commerce" and "affecting" interstate commerce, 0
and these statutes are not limited in applicability to
"commodities. ' '41
Section 1 of the Sherman Act,42 which makes illegal "[e]very
contract, combination. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade,"43 is
particularly relevant in the application of the antitrust laws to ra-
dius clauses. In order to demonstrate that an act constitutes a vio-
lation of section 1, three elements must be shown. First, there
must be a joint action involving at least two actors. In cases chal-
(1960), cited in Antitrust Implications, supra note 10, at 1206 n.19.
37. See, e.g., Saint Anthony-Minneapolis, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 316 F. Supp.
1045 (D. Minn. 1970) (shopping centers are not "in commerce" and do not affect interstate
commerce more than incidentally and indirectly). Although real estate transactions now are
viewed as potentially affecting commerce, they are still regarded as a local activity not in
commerce. See notes 46-61 & accompanying text infra. See also McLain v. Real Estate Bd.
of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980) (potential effect on interstate commerce was held
possible from financing and title insurance attendant to sales of residential property). Cf.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783-85 (1975) (fee schedule for provisions of
legal services, although local in nature, affects interstate commerce).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The Sherman Act reads in pertinent part: "Sec. 1. Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or dommerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal
"Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monpolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ..
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
39. Id. § 46.
40. See note 47 & accompanying text infra.
41. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), and Robinson-Patman Act, id. § 13,
by their very language specify that their applicability is limited to activities involving "com-
modities," whereas the Sherman Act, id. §§ 1-7, and the FTCA, id. §§ 41-58, are not so
limited.
42. Because § 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolies and attempts to monopolize,
proof of sufficient economic power is relevant. If monopoly power can be demonstrated, a
radius clause might be held to be monopolization conduct protecting the monopoly by form-
ing a barrier to entry. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)
(Court, upon proof of sufficient economic power, struck down otherwise legal business prac-
tices as monopolization conduct); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451
(1922) (same). Because the factual questions involved in establishing monopoly power can
only be determined on a case by case basis, potential application of § 2 to radius clauses will
not be analyzed in this Article.
43. See note 38 supra.
lenging restrictive covenants in leases, this requirement virtually
always is met because joint action can always be found between
the lessor-developer and the lessee-retailer. The second and third
elements require that the contract, combination, or conspiracy re-
strain trade or commerce and affect interstate or foreign
commerce.
Section 5 of the FTCA also may be applied in a radius clause
context. Section 5(a)(1) broadly provides: "Unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce are declared unlawful.""
This section has been held to proscribe incipient violations of the
Sherman Act, conduct that is violative of the policies of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts, and even unfair competitive practices be-
yond the letter or spirit of the Sherman and Clayton Acts."
The Regional Shopping Center and Jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act and the FTCA
The first issue in determining the applicability of the Sherman
Act and the FTCA to a real estate lease is whether the interstate
commerce jurisidictional requirement is met.," Jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act can be obtained in either of two situations: when
an activity is "in" or "in the flow" of interstate commerce47--no
matter how minimal its effect-or when an activity not "in" com-
merce nevertheless materially affects commerce.48 In recent cases
the courts have adopted an expansive approach in finding an effect
44. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
45. See notes 108-10 & accompanying text infra.
46. The Fifth Circuit has held that the jurisdictional issue and questions dealing with
the merits can in some cases be so interwoven that they cannot be considered separately
and, therefore, that summary disposition on jurisdictional grounds is inappropriate in most
antitrust actions. McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for Decency Comm., 374 F.2d 359,
361-62 (5th Cir. 1967). See generally Comment, The Confusing World of Interstate Com-
merce and Jurisdiction under the Sherman Act-A Look at the Development and Future
of the Currently Employed Jurisdictional Tests, 21 VIL. L. REV. 721, 724 (1976).
47. See, e.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980);
Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1974); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235-37 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218, 225 (1947); Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184, 1188 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 908 (1976).
48. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 233, at 709-11 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN].
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on interstate commerce, 49  and earlier cases involving restrictive
lease covenants in which interstate commerce jurisdiction was not
found"° would probably be decided otherwise today.
Among the various factors considered by the courts in deter-
mining the existence of a substantial effect on interstate commerce
have been whether the defendant purchases out-of-state supplies,
whether the defendant is financed by interstate companies, and
whether the defendant is patronized by out-of-state customers.5 1
In Harold Friedman Inc. v. Thorofare Markets Inc.,5" a decision
involving the validity of a clause in a shopping center lease provid-
ing that the lessor would not lease to any competitors of a tenant
supermarket, 3 the Third Circuit found sufficient effect on inter-
state commerce to warrant jurisdiction on the basis of both the
decrease and increase of the flow of goods to the respective par-
ties,54 out-of-state supplies, retail sales, and loans for remodeling
49. See, e.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980);
Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); United States v. Employing
Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948); Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075
(4th Cir. 1976).
50. See, e.g., Saint Anthony-Minneapolis, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 316 F. Supp.
1045 (D. Minn. 1970); Savon Gas Stations No. Six, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 529 (D.
Md.), aft'd, 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962) (discussed at note 167 infra).
51. E.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976). Rex Hospi-
tal is instructive because it involved a proposed hospital expansion. Hospitals, like real es-
tate, traditionally have been considered a local activity. The Supreme Court first held that
wholly local business restraints can substantially and adversely affect interstate commerce
and thereby establish Sherman Act jurisdiction. Id. at 743. The Supreme Court then found
that the petitioner's purchase of out-of-state medicines and supplies, its revenues from out-
of-state insurance companies, management fees paid to its out-of-state parent company, and
the multimillion dollar financing of the proposed expansion together substantially affected
interstate commerce. Id. at 744. That the effect was indirect and fortuitous rather than
purposely directed at interstate commerce did not place the conduct at issue outside the
scope of the Sherman Act. Id. The Court also found that the conduct's effect on interstate
commerce can be "substantial" even if it "falls far short of causing enterprises to fold or
affecting market price." Id. at 745.
52. 587 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1978).
53. The plaintiff in Friedman operated seven "Foodland" supermarkets under a
franchise from Fox Grocery Company. The defendant owned and operated a chain of sev-
enty-five supermarkets in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio, and had negotiated a
clause prohibiting the lessor from leasing to a competing supermarket chain. The defendant
had secured similar "exclusive" clauses in most of its leases at other locations. The plaintiff
alleged a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act by Thorofare and by the shopping center's
managing agent. Id. at 130-31.
54. The court noted that effect on interstate commerce may be shown by increases in
the flow of goods as well as by decreases in the flow of goods caused by the anticompetitive
March 1981]
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obtained out-of-state.5  The court further reasoned that "when a
large interstate supermarket chain is in the picture, anticompeti-
tive activities . . . will inevitably have a substantial effect" '56 on
interstate commerce. The fact that the clause was in nearly all of
the defendant's leases was a secondary consideration. 57 Finally, the
court relied on a perceived congressional intent that Sherman Act
jurisdiction be coextensive with the commerce clause, "and conse-
quently, the reach of the Sherman Act expands with each exten-
sion of the commerce power. '58 As currently construed, the court
noted, the reach of the commerce power is broad.5 9
Applying similar reasoning, whenever any store that is a part
of an interstate chain is involved in litigation, interstate commerce
jurisdiction will likely be found. Such outlets of interstate chains,
as well as interstate development companies, are likely to be in-
volved with a regional shopping center. Depending on the facts of
the particular situation, plaintiffs may also establish jurisdiction
by asserting that customers are from out-of-state, advertising is in-
terstate, insurance premiums are paid to interstate companies,
financing is by out-of-state lenders, and that both purchases of
supplies and retail sales affect interstate commerce.60 The determi-
nation of whether the interstate commerce element is met depends
upon a rigorous analysis of the specific facts of each case. 61 Partic-
conduct. Id. at 132.
55. Id. at 132-33. Where the restraint involves a continuing impact on trade as op-
posed to an isolated impact, there is a greater likelihood that an effect upon interstate com-
merce will be found. See Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184, 1190 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
56. 587 F.2d at 136.
57. Id. at 134.
58. Id. at 135. See also Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743
n.2 (1976).
59. 587 F.2d at 135. See also McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S.
232, 241 (1980); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
60. A radius clause could well be a standard provision in all leases of a defendant
developer. However, the jurisdictional hurdle can be met irrespective of whether the restric-
tion is uniformly put into the developer's leases. Although a standard form lease was used in
both Harold Friedman Inc. v. Thorofare Mkts. Inc., 587 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1978), and in
Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1976), no such
factor was present in Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976), on
which both decisions rely.
61. Harold Friedman Inc. v. Thorofare Mkts. Inc., 587 F.2d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 1978).
The court in Friedman stated: "Substantiality of effect ... is to be viewed on a case-by-
case, practical economic basis, from the perspective of whether the local activity has a sig-
nificant impact on competition in commerce and whether the commerce so affected is sub-
stantial in volume." Id. Cf. Note, Sherman Act Challenges to Shopping Center Leases:
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ularly where a regional center or a national chain is involved, the
interstate commerce jurisdictional hurdle can probably be met.
Towards a Standard: The Need to Apply a Rule of Rea-
son Analysis to Radius Clauses
To demonstrate an unlawful restraint of trade under section 1
of the Sherman Act, two distinct modes of analysis have evolved: a
rule of reason and a per se rule. The rule of reason analysis was
developed by the United States Supreme Court in Board of Trade
of the City of Chicago v. United States6 2 in which the Court
stated:
[E]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, re-
strains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test
of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely reg-
ulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the re-
straint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the re-
straint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the par-
ticular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences.
63
A rule of reason analysis thus considers the purpose and history of
a restraint on trade in balancing the positive and negative effects
on competition that the restraint produces.
In contrast to a rule of reason analysis, a per se doctrine holds
certain practices to be so inherently anticompetitive that they are
illegal irrespective of justification. The standard for per se viola-
tions as presently applied was developed by the Supreme Court in
Northern Pacific Railway v. United States:6
Restrictive Covenants as Restraints of Trade Under Section 1, 7 GA. L. RE v. 311, 326
(1973) ("a case-by-case evaluation makes more difficult the task of determining indepen-
dently of a particular factual setting whether or not certain shopping center lease provisions
have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce").
62. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The analysis was first announced in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
63. 246 U.S. at 238.
64. 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The Court first declared that certain agreements were illegal per
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[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and there-
fore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of
per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints
which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the
benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for
an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation
into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related
industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular
restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruit-
less when undertaken. 5
The practices that have been held to be per se violations of
section 1 are pricefixing,6  certain group boycotts,67 tying arrange-
ments,68 and horizontal divisions of markets. 9 As the above-
quoted language indicates, the per se approach is applicable to
avoid complex problems of proving the unreasonableness of a par-
ticular restraint only in cases where previous experience with such
arrangements has established their overwhelmingly "pernicious ef-
fect" on competition as well as the lack of any offsetting redeeming
value. 0
Radius Clauses are not within Any of the Four Categories Ac-
corded Per Se Treatment
The radius clause does not fit into any of the four categories
se in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
65. 356 U.S. at 5.
66. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
67. E.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
68. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
69. E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
70. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Compare White Mo-
tor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963) (Court finding that it could not apply a
per se standard to vertical market allocation agreements because of an absence of judicial
experience with such agreements) with United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365, 379 (1967) (applying a per se standard to a vertical market allocation arrangement) and
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50-59 (1977) (overruling Schwinn




traditionally defined as per se violations of the Sherman Act.7 1 Ra-
dius clauses do not constitute a form of pricefixing, because a ra-
dius clause merely restricts the retailer from opening a second out-
let nearby, without any discernible effect on price. Moreover, no
intention to tamper with the pricing mechanism, a factor that has
given rise to per se illegality,72 is reflected in radius clauses. In this
regard, radius clauses should be distinguished from shopping
center lease provisions restricting a tenant's price range or exclud-
ing discounters. These latter provisions do affect price and there-
fore should be subject to a per se standard. 3
Secondly, the inclusion of a radius clause in a lease cannot
be viewed as a tying arrangement 4 under the Sherman Act 5 be-
71. However, FTC consent decrees have banned some restrictive covenants that have
been construed as per se illegal. See notes 121-48 & accompanying text infra. The issue of
the antitrust implications of radius clauses was raised in two lawsuits in the early 1970's. In
Plum Tree, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 343 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1972), class certification was de-
nied when the trial court held that Plum Tree was an inappropriate representative of the
proposed class. The substantive issues subsequently were resolved in a consent decree,
which did not enjoin radius clauses. See Rouse Co., 85 F.T.C. 848 (1975).
In the second suit, Plum Tree, Inc. v. N.K. Winston Corp., 351 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), the trial court was not optimistic that the plaintiff could overcome the jurisdictional
barrier, but, in refusing to dismiss the claim, the court conceded the possibility of success.
Id. at 88. The case was settled before the merits were ever reached. See Katz, Reasons
Behind $1-Billion Suits, SHOPPING CENTER WORLD, June, 1972, at 23; Kucker, The Pitfalls
of the Plum Tree Argument, SHOPPING CENTER WORLD, Aug., 1972, at 44; Lentzner, supra
note 8, at 33 n.116.
72. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1927); National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d
421, 426 (7th Cir. 1965).
To emphasize the radius clause's lack of effect on price, the defendant could argue that
a radius clause prohibiting a tenant from opening another outlet in a nearby shopping
center permits a competing retailer to open a similar outlet in the second location. See also
notes 130-33 & accompanying text infra.
73. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 630. Where the major tenant or developer is seeking a
high-quality image for a shopping center, however, it can be argued that a clause which
grants a right to exclude retailers who would detract from the ambience of the mall is neces-
sary and only incidentally affects price. See id. at 631. But see Halper, The Antitrust Laws
Visit Shopping Center "Use Restrictions," 4 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 11, 12 (1975) (arguing that a
restriction against discount merchandising is a form of pricefixing) [hereinafter cited as
Halper]. Cf. Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with
Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1202-03 (1973) (right of
approval clauses are areas of potential abuse; "[tihe danger ... is that broad veto provi-
sions will be used to police the pricing policies of present or prospective tenants"). See also
the Gimbel Brothers consent decree in note 129 infra.
74. A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one product ... on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product ... " Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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cause two distinct products are not tied together by the operation
of such clauses. The developer is "selling" the rental of the loca-
tion on the condition that the retailer not "purchase" a second
outlet within a specified distance from the first outlet. The retailer
is not required to buy a second "product" from the developer. In-
stead, the retailer is only precluded from "buying" another lease
from third parties within a geographic locale defined by the radius.
Mr. Lentzner's analysis, which views the leasehold premises as the
tying product and the agreement not to compete nearby as the tied
product6 fails to consider that "[t]he very nature of the, tying con-
cept presupposes that there are distinctive and discernible prod-
ucts or services which a buyer ought to be able to obtain alone, if
he wishes." '7 7 The radius clause does not qualify as a "distinctive
and discernible product." In fact, the argument that radius clauses
or similar restrictive covenants in leases constitute tied products,
when "[c]arried to its logical conclusion . . .mean[s] that 'all
conditions in leases, and hence all leases, are tying arrangements
merely because they embody conditions reciprocally exchanged.' ,,78
Furthermore, tying cases typically have involved only situa-
tions in which the tying and tied products were purchased or
leased by the same party.79 In executing a shopping center lease,
the lease is purchased by the retailer and the radius clause is
"bought" by the developer for its own benefit. This arrangement is
more akin to reciprocal dealing than to a tying arrangement, and
reciprocal dealings have not as yet been ruled per se violations of
the Sherman Act.80
Radius clauses also normally do not constitute per se illegal
horizontal market allocations."1 A retailer's consent to a radiu
75. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), which also prohibits tyin
arrangements, is inapplicable to a real estate lease, because the lease is not a cornmodit'
and is not "in commerce." See notes 35-36 & accompanying text supra. See also Eagle
supra note 1, at 608-09.
76. See Lentzner, supra note 8, at 64.
77. SULLIVAN, supra note 48, § 155, at 443.
78. Antitrust Implications, supra note 10, at 1217 n.70 (quoting Complaint, Counsel'
Memorandum of Legal and Factual Issues at 27, Tyson's Corner Regional Shopping Centei
No. 8886 (F.T.C., filed May 8, 1972)).
79. Id.
80. See SuLLWAN, supra note 48, § 171, at 493-94.
81. A horizontal market allocation is an agreement between competitors at the sam
level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition. Unite
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). While a radius clause is a vertical marke
allocation, an agreement between a major tenant and other tenants to limit the range, eithe
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clause in a lease raises the same issues associated with any alloca-
tion of markets. Because the agreement runs between the devel-
oper and the tenant, it is a vertical arrangement."2 In defining a
market allocation agreement as per se illegal, however, it is the
horizontal nature of the restraint, not the form of the arrangement,
that is determinative. For example, in United States v. Topco As-
sociates, Inc.,83 the arrangement between the purchasing coopera-
tive and its members was vertical. The challenged restraint, how-
ever, resulted in a horizontal division of markets, which rendered it
per se illegal.
8 '
Radius clauses do not create a horizontal market allocation be-
tween the tenant-retailer and its competitors within the shopping
center8 5 because the pernicious effect on competition created by
horizontal market allocations arises from agreements not to com-
pete within certain geographic areas, and such agreements cannot
in price or in quality, of goods sold in the shopping center is a horizontal agreement. Simi-
larly, any agreement among the major tenant and other retailers granting one of them an
"exclusive" is a horizontal market agreement. See Helper, supra note 73, at 11, 14-15.
82. If the developer happens also to be the major tenant, the agreement might seem to
be a horizontal allocation with respect to goods in which the developer and retailer compete,
and therefore per se illegal. The issue of whether a horizontal market allocation or a vertical
market allocation has taken place must be resolved. In United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S.
350 (1967), the factor held to distinguish horizontal restrictions from vertical restrictions
was "whether the territorial arrangements... are. . . the creature of the licensor. . . or
.. . the product of a horizontal arrangement among the licensees." Id. at 352. A market
division among distributors would be considered a horizontal arrangement only if the sys-
tem were organized or imposed by the distributors. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596, 608-09 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352-54 (1967); White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 267 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). However,
because a radius clause is imposed by the developer, who has the dual role of major tenant,
it could be categorized as a vertical restriction. See Denger, Vertical Restrictions: The Im-
pact of Sylvania, 46 ANTImUST L.J. 908, 9.16 (1977). See also notes 85-90 & accompanying
text infra.
83. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). The Topco case involved a joint venture of approximately 25
small and medium sized regional supermarket chains organized to obtain "high quality mer-
chandise under private labels." Id. at 599. The ancillary agreement, entered into by all
members of the association, designated each member's territory in which it could sell Topco
products. Id.
84. Id. at 608. Similarly, in United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), the verti-
cal licensing arrangement between Sealy and its manufacturer-licensees provided that the
licensor covenanted with each manufacturer not to grant any other licenses within a desig-
nated area and the licensees in turn promised not to operate beyond their designated areas.
Id. at 352. Again the Court, looking beyond the vertical form of agreement, found a horizon-
tal territorial restraint. See Comment, The Shopping Center Radius Clause: Candidate for
Antitrust?, 32 Sw. L.J. 825, 847-48 (1978). See note 82 supra.
85. Comment, The Shopping Center Radius Clause: Candidate for Antitrust?, 32 Sw.
L.J. 825, 848 (1978).
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reasonably be implied by the presence of a radius clause.86 Each
lease containing a radius clause is independently negotiated by the
developer and the tenant. The terms of radius clauses are not uni-
form in every lease. A stronger, more desirable tenant is able to
bargain for a less restrictive clause or for its total elimination.
8 7
Competing retailers thus do not participate in a comprehensive
scheme of market allocation. In fact, the retailer remains in compe-
tition with its competitors at the shopping center. A radius clause
restriction is imposed in order to maintain the retailer's competi-
tive strength at the original location. In reality, the radius clause
represents the retailer's agreement not to compete with its own
business in the vicinity of the shopping center.
Notwithstanding the radius clause, the retailer has complete
access to all customers in the locale, but only from one location.
The radius clause thus appears analogous to a "location clause"88s
imposed by a manufacturer on a dealer. Viewed as a location
clause, the validity of the radius clause is governed by Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,s9 which applies a rule of reason
analysis.90
86. See note 82 & accompanying text supra.
87. While larger and more desirable tenants are able to negotiate over the inclusion oi
terms of a radius clause, single stores and small chains lack the bargaining power to chal.
lenge or modify the radius clause. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 18. Small tenants are dissuadec
from challenging the clauses by judicial precedent upholding restrictive covenants of thesi
kinds, the enormous expense of legal remedies, and fear of antagonizing a landlord witl
whom the retailer must deal for many years. Id. at 40 n.144. Stronger tenants, on the othe:
hand, have been able to eliminate or to modify radius clauses to reduce the radius from fiy
to ten miles to two or three miles and the duration from ten to twenty years to two to fivi
years. Id. at 18.
88. A "location clause" is an agreement "that a dealer can sell anywhere to any clas
of customers, but only from locations approved by the manufacturer. . . ." Pitofsky, Th,
Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1
4 (1978). While nonprice vertical restraints such as location clauses, territorial allocationu
and customer allocations are considered vertical restraints with respect to a manufacturer'
distribution network, the rationales applied in considering the legality of these restraints ar
analogous to those applicable in determining the legality of covenants in a shopping cente
lease. In considering the legality of the provisions of a shopping center lease, however, ther
is no issue of sacrificing intrabrand competition to enhance interbrand competition. Se
note 90 & accompanying text infra.
89. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
90. Id. at 59. It can be argued that radius clauses are distinguishable from locatio
clauses, and, therefore, that Sylvania is not controlling, because the sole "product" at isst
is floor space in the shopping center, and this "product" is homogeneous among all compet
tors. Therefore, unlike Sylvania, there is no increased interbrand competition to offset ti
harm to intrabrand competition. Furthermore, it can be argued that the radius clause is
broader restriction than the location clause; the radius clause limiting the retailer to or
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A radius clause also could be viewed as an exclusive dealing
contract in which the retailer covenants with the developer that
the developer's shopping center will be the retailer's exclusive
"supplier" of space within the given radius. Such exclusive dealing
contracts, however, have not been held to the stringent per se
standard.91
Whether or not viewed as location clauses or exclusive dealing
contracts, leases containing radius clauses are analogous to vertical
territorial restraints. Such vertical market restraints are not per se
violations but are judged under a rule of reason.9 2 Additionally, ra-
dius clauses should not be treated as per se illegal under the
Court's analysis in Topco because their effects are not uniformly
anticompetitive. Rather, radius clauses have procompetitive effects
because they serve to strengthen a retailer's position at its original
location.e3
Finally, radius clauses should not be held per se illegal as
group boycotts.9 4 Collective boycotts that have been condemned as
per se violations of the Sherman Act typically involve an agree-
outlet in a particular locale is analogous to a manufacturer restricting a dealer's freedom to
sell both the manufacturer's own product as well as all competitors' corresponding products.
Nevertheless, the radius clause is a vertical nonprice restriction which should be judged
under a rule of reason standard. Although interbrand competition is not increased, the ra-
dius clause does have "redeeming virtues" rendering a per se analysis inappropriate. The
radius clause protects the percentage lease, the cornerstone of real estate financing, and
strengthens the retailer's position at the first location. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
91. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). In determining
the legality of the exclusive dealing agreement in Tampa Electric, a case brought under § 3
of the Clayton Act, the Court considered the duration of the contract, the effect of the
agreement on the relevant market, industry customs, and the purpose of the agreement. Id.
at 333-34.
92. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). Sylvania
held that location clauses, like other nonprice vertically imposed restraints, were to be judg-
ed under a rule of reason. Id. See generally Louis, Vertical Distribution Restraints after
Sylvania: A Postscript and Comment, 76 MICH. L. Rzv. 265 (1977); Pitofsky, The Sylvania
Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. Rv. 1 (1978);
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania De-
cision, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1977). Under a rule of reason analysis, the court must consider
whether the restraint is ancillary to a legitimate business purpose and, if so, whether the
restriction is reasonably necessary to accomplish that legitimate business purpose. See notes
161-62 & accompanying text infra.
93. See Antitrust Implications, supra note 10, at 1210.
94. Boycotts are "concerted efforts by traders at one level to keep others out or inhibit
their competitive efforts at that level by making it more difficult for them to find what
traders at that level need, usually suppliers or customers but sometimes access to transac-
tions with other traders at the same level." SULIVAN, supra note 48, § 83, at 232. See Eagle,
supra note 1, at 605-08.
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ment among parties at one level of commerce to exclude another
party on the same level of commerce.95 Although a developer of a
second shopping center could charge the developer of the original
shopping mall and the retailers who agreed to a radius clause with
a "boycott" of the second shopping center, the charge would be
difficult to support. The horizontal element necessary to establish
an illegal boycott is absent because there is no agreement among
traders at one level of commerce not to deal with another party at
the same level of commerce.96
A boycott also requires a finding of collective action.9 7 The ex-
istence of an agreement between the developer and any one re-
tailer-tenant is apparent from their action in entering into a lease.
The fact that a developer enters into a series of leases containing
radius clauses with individual retailers does not itself, however, es-
tablish a collective agreement among all of the retailers involved.
Although the Supreme Court held in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
United States"8 that a conspiracy can be inferred by course of con-
duct, mere conscious parallelism9 alone does not support such an
inference. 100 To demonstrate the interdependence of seemingly in-
dividual decisions it must be proven'0 1 that the act of the individ-
ual retailers in entering into a lease containing a radius clause was
not merely a similar response to the same conditions, unrelated to
the other retailers' conduct;""2 this burden of proof is traditionally
difficult to meet.
Boycotts and concerted refusals to deal are per se illegal only
95. E.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). See also Note, Sherman Act
Implications of Major Tenant Veto Powers in Regional Shopping Centers, 29 WASH. & Lax
L. Rav. 67, 71 (1972).
96. See note 94 supra.
97. One element of a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act is joint action. See text
accompanying note 43 supra.
98. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
99. Conscious parallelism involves knowingly engaging in activities that are similar to
the activities of one's competitors. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S.
208, 227 (1939). See generally Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 656 (1962).
100. Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199 (3d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962). See also Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Para-
mount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
101. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 321-25 (1939).
102. See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
543-44 (1954).
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where the exclusion is aimed at destroying competition.103 Al-
though radius clauses may present a barrier to a rival developer's
business by making unavailable certain tenants for its stores, there
is no direct interference with the competitor-developer's business,
and the restraint is not so severe as to threaten the competitor
with elimination. 10 4 Thus, radius clauses do not constitute per se
illegal boycotts.10 5
The FTC Consent Decrees Do Not Mandate a Per Se Analysis by
the Courts
The FTC, vested with sole jurisdiction to bring actions under
section 5 of the FTCA,106 has been the most active critic of shop-
ping center leases containing restrictive covenants in recent
years.10 7 The FTC has relied on the FTCA to assume jurisdiction
over incipient violations of the Sherman Act,108 practices that con-
flict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Act,09 and
unfair competitive practices beyond the letter or spirit of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts.110
FTC procedures culminating in consent decrees must be dis-
tinguished from judicial decisions. The FTC initiates action by is-
suing a formal complaint upon a vote by the entire Commission.
103. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959). See also
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
104. But see Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952) (using a per se standard for a discretionary leasing
policy aimed at competitors). Right of approval, no discount store, and exclusive clauses,
however, could constitute a boycott or refusal to deal.
105. Radius clauses do not seem to be the type of restraint that courts find appropri-
ate for applying the per se rule against collective boycotts. The agreements are not generally
in the tenant's interest, but are made for the developer's benefit to protect the percentage
rent. See notes 21-28 & accompanying text supra. Further, individual refusals to deal-the
so-called "trader's prerogative"--are permissible. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919). Finally, although it is a boycott for a store to deny its competitors access to
a shopping center, a radius clause is not directed at a retailer's competitor. In fact, a radius
clause is not directed against any specific entity. See notes 85-91 & accompanying text
supra. It merely restricts a retailer to a specific location within the given radius.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 11 1979). Section 5 declares unlawful
"[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce." Id.
107. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 46-47.
108. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948).
109. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966). See also Lentzner, supra
note 8, at 48 n.171.
110. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972). See also
Lentzner, supra note 8, at 48 n.171.
March 1981]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The formal complaint may lead to a settlement with a resultant
consent order.""1 The consent decree is not an admission of wrong-
doing and is without precedential value in subsequent judicial pro-
ceedings;" 2 it is binding only with respect to the party involved.
'The consent order is, however, precedent with respect to future
FTC actions.1 8 Any violation of a consent order is punishable by a
civil fine of up to $10,000 for each violation.1 4 If no settlement is
reached, the case is decided by a hearing examiner,1 5 whose ruling
may be reversed by the Commission.116 The Commission's decision
may in turn be appealed to the federal courts.11 7 Once a violation is
found, the FTC issues a cease and desist order, the violation of
which can result in fines of up to $10,000 a day. 18
In recent years, the FTC has issued complaints against some
of the nation's largest shopping center tenants and developers.""'
In order to understand fully the impact of and procedures involved
in FTC consent decrees involving shopping center lease provisions,
several recent decrees will be discussed. Several of the complaints
challenged covenants granting the right of approval over leasing
arrangements to three major department stores which enabled the
stores to exclude discounters from Tysons Corner Regional Shop-
ping Center.
20
Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tysons Corner Regional Shopping
Center121 was the first case filed in federal court dealing with a
111. P. AREDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS I 158(b) (2d ed. 1974). See FEDERAL TRADE CoM-
MISSION, ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES, RULES OF PRACTICE AND STANDARDS oF CONDUCT, Con-
sent Order Procedure §§ 2.31-.34 (1979). See also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST CON-
SENT DECREE MANUAL (1979).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (Supp. I1 1979); Lentzner, supra note 8, at 48 n.173. Final
orders of the FTC are admissible as prima facie evidence of wrongdoing in private treble
damage suits. See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R. Fed. 307 (1972).
113. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 48 n.173.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1976).
115. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES, RULES OF PRACTICE,
AND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, Consent Order Procedure §§ 2.31-.35 (1979); Lentzner, supra
note 8, at 48 n.173.
116. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 48 n.173.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1976). Review is by the court of appeals in any circuit in which
the defendant does business. Id.
118. Id. § 45(1). Such sanctions are exceptional, however. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 4E
n.173.
119. See notes 121-48 & accompanying text infra.
120. Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TEm
REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,532 (F.T.C. 1974). See notes 121-23 & accompanying text infra.
121. 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C.), affd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The leases gavi
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"right of approval" clause, specifically a "no discounter" clause.122
A discount appliance store that was denied admission to the mall
located in Fairfax County, Virginia, by two department stores al-
leged a group boycott by the developer and the major tenants1 2 3 in
violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.124 When the lease
provisions were upheld by the court,125 the FTC reacted by issuing
a complaint on a group boycott theory, expressly rejected in Dalmo
Sales, as well as charging that the power to exclude potential com-
petitors raised the issue of pricefixing. 126 Ultimately, all three de-
partment stores were subjected to FTC investigation and surren-
dered their veto power over admission of new tenants. 27
At about the same time, the FTC also began examining con-
tracts between Gimbel Brothers Department Store and various de-
velopers granting Gimbels broad powers of tenant approval in
shopping centers in which Gimbels maintained a store.128 The
Gimbels consent order,1 2 9 typical of the settlements sought by the
major tenants a ight to approve tenants not on a list of 465 approved stores. 308 F. Supp.
at 990.
122. 308 F. Supp. at 990-91.
123. The defendants were Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center (the developer),
the May Department Stores Company, the Hecht Company (a department store operated
by the May Company), Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., and City Stores Company (which oper-
ated an outlet in the mall). Id. at 989. It was Hecht Company and Woodward & Lothrop
that had actually disapproved Dalmo's admission. Id. at 992-93.
124. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
125. 308 F. Supp. at 994-95.
126. Ultimately the suit was settled without a determination on the merits. See Final
Order to Cease and Desist, Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,532 (F.T.C. 1974); Lentzner, supra note 8, at 49 n.175.127. See Final Order to Cease and Desist, Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center,
[1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,532 (F.T.C. 1974). See also
Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, 85 F.T.C. 970 (1975) (a cease and desist order
against City Stores, a tenant of Tysons Corner).
128. See Gimbel Bros., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1320 (1974). Other consent decrees were issued
in Food Fair Stores, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 709 (1975), and Rouse Co., 85 F.T.C. 848 (1975). See
Halper, supra note 73, at 8.
129. The final consent decree most representative of the FTC's current policy on the
types of radius clauses that are considered per se illegal is Gimbel Bros., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1320
(1974). The order prohibits Gimbel Brothers from making any agreement that: "1. grants
respondent the right to approve or disapprove the entry into a shopping center of any other
retailer; 2. grants respondent the right to approve or disapprove the amount of floor space
that any other retailer may lease or purchase in a shopping center; 3. prohibits the admis-
sion into a shopping center of any particular retailer or class of retailers, including, for pur-
poses of illustration: (a) other department stores, (b) junior department stores, (c) discount
stores, or (d) catalogue stores; 4. limits the types of merchandise or brands of merchandise
or service which any other retailer in a shopping center may offer for sale; 5. specifies that
any other retailer in a shopping center shall or shall not sell its merchandise or services at
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FTC, substantially curtailed practices such as right of approval,
but allowed certain other practices to continue despite their failure
to conform with previously expressed FTC policy.13 0 In particular,
the consent order permitted Gimbels to prohibit rental of shopping
center space to "objectionable" tenants such as shops dealing in
pornographic material or topless bars. 131 The order also gave the
major tenant a right of approval under the "ice-cream wrapper
rule, ' 3 2 a right to approve or reject a tenant in the immediate vi-
cinity of the tenant's door without having to justify the decision on
the "clearly objectionable" standard, provided such exclusions are
not based on price ranges, price lines, trade names, store names,
trademarks, or brands. 33 The Tysons Corner decree went further
by permitting major tenants to sign leases requiring that the devel-
oper consider the objective of a balanced and diversified group of
any particular price or within any range of prices; 6. grants respondent the right to approve
or disapprove the location in a shopping center of any other retailer; 7. specifies or prohibits
any type of advertising by other retailers, other than advertising within a shopping center; 8.
prohibits price advertising within a shopping center by retailers. . . in such a way as to
make it difficult for customers to discern advertised prices from the common area of such
shopping center; or 9. prevents expansion of a shopping center." Id. at 1324-25.
The FTC had attacked as per se violations of the antitrust laws lease clauses containing
the following restrictions: "(a) fixing, controlling, and maintaining retail prices; (b) allowing
major tenants to choose their competitors and to exclude actual and potential competitors;
(c) eliminating discount advertising and discount selling; (d) denying the public the benefit
of price competition; (e) boycotting potential satellite tenant entrants to the shopping
center; and (f) restricting, hindering, and coercing the developer in his choice of potential
tenants in the shopping center." Complaint at 11, Tysons Corner Regional Shopping
Center, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,003, at 22,004 (F.T.C.
1974). Similar lease restrictions were challenged in Rich's, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder]
TRAbE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,118 (F.T.C. 1976). See Schear & Sheehan, supra note 3, at
616-20.
The most recent shopping center consent decree was announced on January 17, 1979.
See Federated Department Stores, [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRAE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,505 (F.T.C. 1979). In Federated, the FTC charged that department stores of the Feder-
ated chain had excluded discounters and other potential competitors from shopping centers
in which the Federated stores were located. Although Federated did not admit to any viola-
tions of law, it did agree to consent to an order prohibiting any agreement with a shopping
center developer that enabled the department store to: "(1) select its fellow tenants in a
shopping center; (2) dictate the services or merchandise brands offered by other tenants; (3)
dictate the prices charged by other stores in the shopping center; (4) prohibit price advertis-
ing by other tenants; (5) unreasonably influence the location or amount of space in the
shopping center allocated to other tenants; and (6) unreasonably interfere with the use of
property adjacent to the shopping center." Id. at 21,536. This agreement is not a final order.
130. 83 F.T.C. at 1325-26.
131. Id. at 1326. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 622-23.
132. 83 F.T.C. at 1325-26.
133. Id.
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retail stores in selecting other tenants.'"
An additional limitation on the impact of these recent consent
decrees is evidenced by the fact that the proscribed practices are
outlawed only in-particular types of shopping centers. 135 For exam-
ple, Gimbels remained free to engage in any of the practices pro-
hibited by its consent decree whenever it opened an outlet in a
shopping center containing less than 200,000 square feet of floor
area or in a shopping center with only one major tenant and less
than 50,000 square feet of floor area occupied by satellite
tenants.1
36
In 1976, the FTC announced its first consent order involving a
radius clause. 13 7 The order forbade the Strawbridge & Clothier de-
partment store from making any agreement which "[e]stablishes or
maintains a radius or distance from shopping centers within which
a retailer may not operate another store similar to or in competi-
tion with that retailer's own store at the shopping center."'1 8 The
prohibition, however, applied to the department store as a tenant
and not as a developer and therefore was only directed against the
horizontal aspects of the clause at issue. 39
A more comprehensive decree dealing with radius clauses was
issued against Sears, Roebuck & Company,14 0 ordering Sears to
cease and desist from imposing radius restrictions on any of its
tenants,141 both in its role as a major tenant and as a developer.1
42
134. Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 20,532, at 20,465 (F.T.C. 1974).
135. See, e.g., Gimbel Bros., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1320, 1324 (1974).
136. Id. See Halper, supra note 73, at 18.
137. See Strawbridge & Clothier, 87 F.T.C. 593 (1976).
138. Id. at 601.
139. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 52.
140. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 89 F.T.C. 240 (1977). The prohibitions again apply only to
large shopping centers. The order prohibits Sears as a major tenant from making-or enforc-
ing any agreement that: (a) prohibits entry into centers of particular tenants or classes of
tenants or allows Sears to approve tenant entry;, (b) grants Sears the right to approve other
tenants' floor space or their use of it; (c) specifies that tenants must'sell merchandise at any
particular price, or within any range of prices, fashion, or quality (when the latter terms
connote price); (d) limits discpunt advertising, pricing, or selling; (e) limits the types of
merchandise or services which other tenants may sell; (f) prescribes minimum hours of oper-
ation; (g) grants Sears the right to approve tenant location; or (h) provides for radius re-
strictions upon tenants. Other provisions of the order prohibit Sears as a developer from
controlling prices of other tenants' merchandise, imposing radius restrictions, or condition-
ing tenant entry upon that tenant's agreement to occupy space in other Homart Centers. Id.
at 249-50.
141. Id. at 249.
142. Id. at 250.
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Because the FTC's strategy has been to proceed against the larger
targets as an example to the rest of the industry,143 the Sears de-
cree provides guidance as to the FTC's position on shopping center
lease provisions.
Insofar as the Sears decree prohibited use of the radius clause
without regard to the nature of the retailer's business or to the
geographic or time limits involved, many shopping center owners
have inferred that the FTC holds radius clauses to be illegal per
se. 144 Nevertheless, an FTC spokesman stated that the Sears de-
cree should not be construed as an FTC decision that radius
clauses were per se violations.145 Rather, it reflects a reaction to the
particular clauses at issue, not the FTC's position generally.146 In
fact, FTC members seem to be divided on the appropriate way to
deal with radius clause restrictions. One official has stated that
while the Strawbridge & Clothier order reflects the position of the
FTC towards radius clauses in certain regional malls, it appears
143. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 55-56. In response to charges that the FTC policy of
"selective enforcement" has been unfair, the FTC announced its intention to promulgate a
comprehensive set of rules governing shopping center lease provisions to apply equally to all
developers and major tenants in the country. See Wall Street Journal, Jan. 26, 1977, at 34,
col. 1; FTC Bureau of Competition Considers Regulating Competition by Rulemaking,
ATRR News & Comment (BNA) No. 793 A-23, Dec. 14, 1976, cited in Lentzner, supra note
8, at 56 n.199. However, these rules were never promulgated because the consent orders
were found to be sufficiently specific.
144. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 57 n.203.
145. Statement of David Laufer, Senior Trial Attorney, Bureau of Competition, re-
printed in International Council of Shopping Centers, Newsletter, June, 1977, at 10, col 2,
quoted in Lentzner, supra note 8, at 57. Apart from the issue of whether radius clauses were
held to a per se or rule of reason analysis, Mr. Laufer stated that the status of exclusive
clauses, locations clauses, and use provisions was unsettled. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 57
n.201. However, he further indicated that the Tysons Corner cases resolved that tenant
approval clauses, no-discounter clauses, and any clause involving price interference or ad-
vertising prohibitions were illegal. Id.
146. Mr. Laufer stated: "Many of you have complained privately of the provisions in
the Sears' order prohibiting Sears from imposing radius restrictions on tenants. Your legiti-
mate concern is that the provision may mean that the FTC considers radius restrictions
illegal per se, a position contrasting sharply with current case law, which requires radius
clauses to be examined under a rule of reason analysis. While I share your concern, I don't
think the FTC's action in either Sears or Strawbridge & Clothier ... is incompatible with
the case law. Remember, Sears and S & C are consent agreements .... Also... the staff
* . . probably felt that the facts warranted the prohibitions; that is, the clauses in these
cases were unreasonable. I hasten to add that this is my own view, and I could be wrong
about the Commission's ultimate position .... [A]l you can really say right now is that
the Commission has not been presented with the opportunity to say whether or not it holds
radius restrictions illegal per se." International Council of Shopping Centers, Newsletter,
June, 1977, at 10, 15, quoted in Lentzner, supra note 8, at 58 n.204.
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that the FTC would uphold certain radius clauses in smaller shop-
ping centers under a rule of reason analysis.14 A second official,
however, believed that the FTC might take a per se approach to
radius clauses, viewing such restrictions as horizontal territorial
restraints.148
The FTC's reliance on informal settlements to accomplish its
objectives has obviated the need for a definitive legal theory on
which to base its actions. The FTC has not been forced, therefore,
to determine whether a per se or rule of reason analysis should be
applied to radius clauses.149 The recently enacted Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978,150 however, provides support for the position
that Congress has indicated that a rule of reason analysis is appro-
priate in determining whether radius clauses violate the Sherman
Act. Section 365(b)(3) of the Act states that:
adequate assurance of future performance of a lease of real prop-
erty in a shopping center includes adequate assurance... that
assumption or assignment of such lease will not breach substan-
tially any provision, such as a radius, location, use, or exclusivity
provision, in any other lease, financing agreement, or master
agreement relating to such shopping center .... 161
Although Congress did not expressly intend to immunize restric-
tive covenants from per se illegality under the Sherman Act, recog-
nition of the use of radius clauses in the language of the Bank-
ruptcy Act-promulgated after the possibility of a per se standard
of illegality was raised in FTC proceedings-arguably implies that
Congress did not intend that a per se standard be applied in cases
challenging the legality of radius clauses.
Finally, the fact that the FTC asserts a per se theory and ne-
gotiates consent decrees carries no judicial weight. 5 2 These settle-
ments are resolved on the basis of negotiation, not on the strength
of legal analysis. The consent orders are law only with respect to
147. Letter from Daniel C. Schwartz, Assistant Director for Evaluation at the Bureau
of Competition, FTC, to Jay Lentzner (Aug. 20, 1976), reprinted in part in Lentzner, supra
note 8, at 52 n.187.
148. Letter from Harvey Dzodin to Jay Lentzner (Aug. 11, 1976), reprinted in part in
Lentzner, supra note 8, at 52 n.187. Mr. Dzodin is an attorney with the FTC.
149. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 52 n.187. Staff determinations, on which settlements
are based, are not official FTC decisions and are not the equivalent of binding judicial reso-
lutions. Id. See notes 111-18 & accompanying text supra.
150. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-151326 (Supp. 1I 1979).
151. Id. § 365 (Supp. 11 1979). This section in general deals with the termination,
assumption, assignment, and rejection of executory contracts and leases.
152. See notes 111-18 & accompanying text supra.
March 1981]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
future FTC actions.5 5
Regional Shopping Centers as Joint Ventures
A regional shopping center-a "single, integrated retail com-
munity"154-is analogous to a joint venture,155 typified by an inter-
dependence and cooperation among the developer, major tenants,
and satellite tenants, with each retailer in turn generating custom-
ers for the other.156 Joint ventures characteristically establish en-
trance requirements for membership,57 and set mutual limitations
on members' freedom to deal with outsiders.15 8 Radius clauses ex-
emplify the limitations on freedom to deal, while right of approval
and exclusive clauses are examples of entrance requirements.
Because some desirable goals and essential services are real-
ized only through joint ventures,159 courts have used a rule of rea-
son analysis to judge the validity of joint ventures and of any re-
153. See note 113 & accompanying text supra.
154. Note, Sherman Act Implications of Major Tenant Veto Powers in Regional
Shopping Centers, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 67, 67 (1972). The regional shopping center has
been recognized as a joint merchandising venture. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL Bus-
INESS, THE IMPACT OF SUBURBAN SHOPPING CENRS ON INDEPENDENT RETAILERS, S. REP. No.
1016, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 8 (1960), cited in Antitrust Implications, supra note 10, at
1206 n.19.
155. A joint venture is defined as "an association of persons [or companies] with in-
tent, by way of contract, express or implied, to engage in and carry out a single business
venture for joint profit, for which purpose they combine their efforts, property, money, skill,
and knowledge, without creating a partnership or a corporation. ... " 46 AM. Jur. 2d Joint
Ventures § 1, at 21-22 (1971).
156. A shopping center may be viewed as a quasi-cooperative venture in which the
various stores form a common identity to attract customers to their "one-stop" shopping
service. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 15. "Probably the greatest advantage to being a part of a
shopping complex is that a tenant's presence along with the collection of other business
establishments will attract a variety of customers ... which no single store could accom-
plish on its own." Id. at 15-16. By opening a second outlet at another shopping center, the
tenant would divert potential business from the other retailers in the shopping center. Id. at
15. See notes 29-30 & accompanying text supra.
The joint venture aspect of a shopping center also is enforced by the existence of a
merchants' association as well as by assessment of common area costs, promotion fees, taxes,
and cooperative advertising. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 15 n.45.
157. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1945). See generally
Comment, The Antitrust Implications of Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center
Leases, 18 VmL. L. REv. 721, 736-42 (1973). .
158. Comment, The Antitrust Implications of Restrictive Covenants in Shopping
Center Leases, 18 VmL. L. REv. 721, 737 (1973).
159. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). For a discussion of
the difficulties involved in the financing of shopping center developments and the inherent
interdependence of tenants and developer, see notes 15-30 & accompanying text supra.
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straints on trade which they impose.160 The courts have scrutinized
refusals to deal by members of a joint venture under the rule of
reason because the restraint is viewed as ancillary to the agreement
creating the joint venture and necessary to the primary purpose of
the joint venture."6 ' Any effect on third parties generally is inci-
dental to the primary objective of the joint venture.6 2 Radius
clauses are necessary to effectuate the lawful purpose of maximiz-
ing sales volume and customer traffic at the shopping center and,
therefore, should be judged under a rule of reason.6 3
Judicial treatment of restrictive covenants in shopping center
leases further indicates that radius clauses are analogous to the
type of restrictive covenants contained in joint venture agreements
and thus should not be held to be per se violations. In Dalmo
Sales,'" the district court upheld the validity of a "no discounter"
right of approval provision under a rule of reason analysis.6 5 Simi-
160. Comment, The Antitrust Implications of Restrictive Covenants in Shopping
Center Leases, 18 VUL. L. Rav. 721, 737 (1973). Most decisions on concerted refusals to deal
by joint ventures have been based on membership exclusions. See, e.g., Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194
F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952). While a regional shopping center usu-
ally is essential to a retailer because there is no other shopping center within the same
trading area, the retail tenants withheld from a second developer by a radius clause are not
likely to be vital to the developer because of the significant numbers of other potential
tenants.
161. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Under the doctrine of
ancillary restraints, a trade restraint which, standing alone, would be illegal under a rule of
reason may be lawful if reasonable and necessary to aid an otherwise lawful arrangement.
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and
aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See also Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918). If, however, the ancillary agreement standing alone would be per se
illegal, the fact that there is an underlying valid joint venture may not save the restraint.
See note 83 supra.
162. See Barber, Refusals to Deal under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L.
Rav. 847, 876-77 (1955).
163. Radius clauses also have been justified as necessary to protect the capital risked
by all involved in the shopping center. See Lentzner, supra note 8, at 16. A final rationale
justifying the use of radius clauses is that not only have such restrictions on expansion been
enforced for years, but similar restrictive covenants have traditionally been enforced in busi-
ness. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 598 nn.88-91; Lentzner, supra note 8, at 12. Radius clauses
are said to be based on covenants-not-to-compete which have long been inserted in con-
tracts for the sale of a business. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 12, 24 n.79, 25 nn.85-88. In fact,
courts have generally recognized that in every land sale contract there is an implied cove-
nant of good faith requiring the parties to refrain from doing anything to deny the benefits
of the agreement to the others. Id. at 16 n.49.
164. 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C.), afl'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See notes 121-25
& accompanying text supra.
165. 308 F. Supp. at 990-91.
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larly, courts have, with one exception, upheld the use of "exclusive
clauses"'66 under a rule of reason analysis.6 7 Even in Pay Less
Drug Stores Northwest, Inc. v. City Products Corp.,0 5 the sole
case in which an exclusive clause in a shopping center lease was
struck down, the court reached its result under a rule of reason,
not a per se analysis. 6 " Because the courts have uniformly ex-
166. For a description of "exclusive clauses," see note 8 & accompanying text supra.
See generally Baum, Lessors' Covenants Restricting Competition, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 228;
Note, Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center Leases, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 940 (1959). See,
e.g., J.M. Fields of Anderson, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 310 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1962).
167. E.g., Borman's Inc. v. Great Scott Super Mkts., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.
Mich. 1975); Savon Gas Stations No. Six, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md.),
afl'd, 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963). Savon is considered the
most authoritative statement by a federal court on the validity of exclusive clauses.
Lentzner, supra note 8, at 34 n.120. In Savon a lease granting defendants the exclusive right
to sell gasoline adjacent to a shopping center was held not to violate the Sherman Act. The
lease between Shell and the landlord contained a covenant that prohibited the landlord
from renting any of its remaining property in the vicinity to a second gas station and that
guaranteed direct access from the shopping center to the service station. Two years later,
the landlord leased space to Savon on the other side of the shopping center with similar
direct access to the parking lot. When Shell objected, the landlord erected a barrier between
the Savon station and the shopping center. Savon's sales fell, and it brought suit.
The Fourth Circuit upheld the validity of the exclusive clause, recognizing that the
economic viability of a shopping center depended on the proper mix of tenants and that the
granting of an exclusive right to sell certain products was sometimes necessary to create this
proper balance of tenants. 309 F.2d at 309. The circuit court also found that because 10
major service stations were located within a three block radius of the shopping center, com-
merce had not been injured. Id. at 309-10. There was no evidence of pricefixing or of boy-
cotting a competitor. Id. at 310. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant
had not interfered with Savon's business because customers could still obtain the plaintiff's
services by using public streets. Id. at 310.
In Borman's, a more recent case, a preliminary injunction was granted to enjoin a com-
peting supermarket from obtaining access to a shopping center. Borman's had brought an
antitrust action to invalidate the partial exclusive clause contained in Great Scott's lease in
the neighborhood shopping center. The covenant was held to be valid under a rule of reason
analysis. 433 F. Supp. 349-50. The court emphasized that the small shopping center in-
volved already had two grocery stores. Id. at 351. The court held that, in order to prevail,
the plaintiff would have to prove that the exclusion denied reasonable market alternatives
and was an unreasonable restraint. Id. at 351. Because Borman's did in fact have other
stores in the area, and therefore was not completely excluded from the area, the court in
dicta suggested that Borman's could not prevail in the lawsuit. State courts also have not
applied a per se standard to restrictive covenants in leases. See, e.g., Benjamin's of Dover,
Inc. v. Jardel Co., 289 A.2d 642, 644 (Del. Ch. 1972); Utica Square, Inc. v. Renberg's, Inc.,
390 P.2d 876, 880-81 (Okla. 1964); Nieman-Marcus v. Hexter, 412 S.W.2d 915, 917-18 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967).
168. 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,385 (D. Ore. 1975). In Pay Less, the defendant was
a national variety store chain. Its lease prohibited the landlord from renting any space
within 3000 feet of one of its stores to any competitor.
169. Id. Significantly, the competitor had no other preexisting location, and the shop-
ping center was the only effective means by which it could compete.
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amined these lease restrictions under a rule of reason, it would be
anomalous not to treat radius clauses in a similar manner.
Applying the Rule of Reason to Radius Clauses
In applying the general principles of a rule of reason analy-
sis"7° to radius clauses, the reasonableness of the distance and du-
ration limitations depends in part on the reasonableness of the ra-
dius clause's specific terms." 1 This inquiry considers whether the
restraint is broader than necessary for the protection of the devel-
oper;172 whether the restraint imposes undue hardship on the re-
tailer; and whether the benefit to the developer outweighs any in-
jury to the public.17 3 If a standard radius clause is inserted in all of
the developer's leases and no effort is made to tailor those terms to
the individual needs of the tenant or to the specific circumstances
of the shopping center, a finding of unreasonableness is more
likely.
Radius clauses generally are not viewed as injurious to the
public because preventing the existing retailer from opening a sec-
ond outlet encourages other competitors to open a store in the lo-
cale. 17 4 Furthermore, the public always has access to the existing
location. Rather, the clauses have been viewed in terms of injury to
the retailer. Weighed against the developer's justifications for ra-
170. See notes 62-63 & accompanying text supra. According to Professor Handler, the
measure of the reasonableness of an agreement not to compete may be the same test applied
to restrictions in employment contracts and sales contracts. M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R.
PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 43-45 (1975).
171. Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with Re-
strictive Covenants under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1193 (1973). It is more
likely that the radius clause will be validated if the developer includes terms permitting the
retailer to establish a second location if sales from that outlet are included in the calculation
of the percentage rent at the first location, or permitting renegotiation of the base rent. See
Comment, The Shopping Center Radius Clause: Candidate for Antitrust?, 32 Sw. L.J. 825,
852-53 (1978).
172. This includes a determination of the reasonableness of the clause's distance and
duration limitations.
173. Not only is the size of the center relevant, but the concentration of alternative
shopping centers in the immediate area is important. Where numerous stores in an area deal
in comparable merchandise, sufficient marketing alternatives exist to negate an anticompeti-
tive effect. See Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with
Restrictive Covenants under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (1973).
174. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS, THE SHOPPING CENTER INDUSTRY
AND ANTITRUST LAWS 13 (1973) (proceedings of a law conference held at Safety Harbor, Fla.,
Oct. 17-19, 1972) (remarks of Albert Sussman) quoted in Lentzner, supra note 8, at 16 n.50.
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dius clauses,175 the tenant's potential argument that the "the de-
velopers' reliance on a radius provision as a competitive edge is
misplaced, since it is the qualitative identity of the shopping
center as a whole, and not the isolation of a component retailer
that will most affect consumer traffic. 17 e Tenants assert that the
use of radius clauses does not prevent outside competition and
therefore does not enhance the center's drawing power. Instead,
the clause merely restrains competition by tenant-retailers.1 77
Tenants also have maintained that the landlord who restricts
a tenant to one location creates a weaker tenant less able to sur-
vive in today's market,178 because "[tlo operate successfully it is
important for the retailer to be in the key suburban shopping cen-
ters in his trade area."1 79 Furthermore, tenants argue that the util-
ity of the clauses is limited. As developers have modified their ra-
dius clauses to make them "more reasonable" and able to
withstand scrutiny by the FTC,8 0 both time and area restrictions
have been reduced,"8 1 and thus most clauses are in effect only dur-
ing the early years of an outlet's development. Because of start-up
costs and lack of established clientele, percentage rental revenues
are likely to be smallest during these early years. 8 2 Moreover, it is
argued that these early years during which a radius clause would
be in effect are when a retailer would be least likely to undertake
expanding to a second location. 8 s Thus, tenants argue the radius
clause is in effect during the period when it is least significant.'
175. See notes 21-27 & accompanying text supra.
176. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 17. See generally id. at 17-24. One survey of three
California shopping centers concluded that the success of the venture depended on eco-
nomic factors, not the imposition of a radius clause. Id. at 18-19. In fact, some retailers who
opened second outlets in rival centers did not lose more. sales than the retailers who contin-
ued to operate only in the first location and some who opened stores in a second shopping
center increased sales at the first location. Id. at 19. Mr. Lentzner concludes that when a
geographic market can support more than one shopping center and when the older center
maintains its consumer appeal, an individual retailer can successfully operate from both
locations. Id. at 19. His survey, however, was based on a very small sample and its reliabil-
ity, therefore, may be questioned.
177. Id. at 21.
178. Id. at 24.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 23. See notes 106-18 & accompanying text supra.
181. Lentzner, supra note 8, at 23. Radius clauses usually extend two to five miles and






On the other hand, if it can be argued that a clause is in effect only
during the years when it has the least impact, it can also be said
that such a clause does not constitute an effective restraint on
competition.
Finally, tenants argue that it is inconsistent for a landlord to
bind tenants with a radius clause and at the same time surround
them with numerous competitors in like goods and services within
the same shopping complex.28 5 However, the very retailers who
complain that radius clauses imposed by landlords are restraints in
violation of antitrust laws often demand similar restrictive cove-
nants for their own protection. For example, retailers often de-
mand exclusive clauses-which are simply the reverse of radius
clauses-limiting competition in the goods or services to be offered
for sale by that retailer.
The radius clause often bears on other terms of the lease, for
example, the amount of base rent 8 6 and percentage rent provi-
sions. The classic common law argument justifying ancillary re-
straints-that the cost of such restrictions is reflected in the con-
tract price'8 7-- is therefore applicable. Although Mr. Lentzner
argues that the omission of a radius clause has no effect on the
remainder of the lease, 8 s his statement is largely unsupported. His
argument that decisions as to potential future- expansion cannot
correctly be made on the basis of market conditions at the time of
the lease and therefore should be left to the tenant to determine
when there is sufficient demand for an additional outlet1 89 is simi-
larly flawed. In fact, contractual terms routinely are established at
the time of agreement and have always reflected this problem of
predicting future market conditions. Furthermore, if tenants were
truly able to determine when market conditions support expan-
sion, retail businesses would be likely to have a lower rate of fail-
185. Id.
186. Without the protection to rents afforded by radius clauses, landlords might be
forced to increase the base rent. Higher minimum rents would in turn force out small te-
nants who could not afford higher prices. Id. at 65.
187. See id. at 60.
188. Mr. Lentzner also believes that radius clauses are of little benefit to landlords. Id.
at 61. He states that "radius clauses are unreasonable restraints of trade that do not serve
the public, do little or nothing to enhance the economic position of the landlord, and un-
fairly weaken the ability of tenants to compete vigorously in the marketplace .... [Tihe
appropriate legal remedy would be to eliminate radius restrictions through the application
of a per se rule." Id. at 61.
189. Id. at 63.
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ure than they presently do.
Conclusion
The tenant who has availed itself of the benefits of a devel-
oped shopping center 190 should not then complain of reasonable re-
straints imposed in the interests of the joint venture as a whole.
The retailer's decision to locate in the mall reflects an awareness
that a shopping center will attract significantly more trade than a
retailer operating alone in another setting would be able to at-
tract.191 Both the developer and retailers who have put their
money at risk have a vested interest in the shopping center's abil-
ity to function as an integrated unit for maximum success. This
interdependence creates the need for mutual limitations on the
members' freedom to deal with outsiders. Such restraints should
be viewed as ancillary and necessary to the primary purpose of the
joint venture between the developer and its tenants.
190. See Antitrust Implications, supra note 10, at 1210.
191. Note, The Shopping Centre Lease, 35 U. TORONTO FACULTY L. Rav. 107, 107
(1977).
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